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The publication in 2010 of the 30th Anniversary edition of Lipsky’s 1980 book, 
Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in Public Services, 
indicates the enduring contribution of this classic work. The breadth of 
scholarship drawing inspiration from Lipsky is indicated by the nearly 7000 
citations of this book in Google Scholar. The book’s continuing relevance globally 
and across sectors lies both in the continued importance of public services and 
its focus on what remains their central challenge: ‘how to treat citizens alike in 
their claims on government and how at the same time to be responsive to the 
individual case when appropriate’ (Lipsky 2010, p.xii). The practical relevance of 
the analysis is, moreover, made clear by the response to it of those involved in 
policy implementation: it not only just makes sense, but it also encourages them 
to reflect on how to work differently (e.g. Brodkin 2012; Rowe 2012).  
 
In this chapter, I will briefly outline the core features of the theory of street level 
bureaucracy (SLBy) and then discuss what I see as its key contributions to the 
field of public policy analysis.  This discussion illuminates the analytic and 
practice relevance of this book (Brodkin, 2012).  
 
In analytic terms, Lipsky’s book brought public administration work into 
conversation with public policy and political science. Lipsky was neither the first 
to consider administrative discretion (Davis 1969; Wilson 1978) or 
organisational influences over agents’ behaviour (Argyris 1964; McGregor 
1960). Nonetheless, his comprehensive and eloquent analysis, derived from 
analysis across diverse work settings, presented a timely challenge to those 
considering implementation primarily from a political science perspective. His 
consideration of what the street level bureaucrats responsible for public service 
delivery actually do in policy implementation and how their actions differ from 
the policy pronouncements of central level planners, contradicted the 
assumptions of top-down analysts, as exemplified by Pressman and Wildavsky 
(1973). Key among these assumptions were that policy goals were clear, 
knowable and operationalisable, and that policy is decided by politicians and 
simply implemented by public administrators. By indicating the limits of central 
control over SLBs’ behaviour and proposing alternative strategies for holding 
them to accountable for their actions, Lipsky was, moreover, ‘in many respects 
the founding father of the bottom up perspective’ (Hill & Hupe, 2009, p. 52).  
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The practical relevance of the book is, meanwhile, political - to use research on 
street level bureaucracies to improve the performance of public social welfare 
agencies, bolstering political support for, and generating greater investment in, 
them. Although Lipsky’s insights on how to improve the performance of these 
agencies remain pertinent today, the still limited research around these ideas 
indicates that this practical project remains a particular priority for future work.  
 
 
Street Level Bureaucracy: core elements  
 
Lipsky’s (2010) preface to the anniversary edition provides a good summary of 
the core elements of the theory, from the author’s own perspective. 
 
Street level bureaucracies are the public services whose workers ‘interact with 
and have wide discretion over the dispensation of benefits or allocation of public 
sanctions’ (p.xi) and through whom citizens ‘experience directly the government 
they have implicitly constructed’ (p.xi). Although there are many different types 
of public service workers, their work is not only ‘often highly scripted to achieve 
policy objectives’ (p. xii) originating in the political process, but at the same time 
it also commonly requires them to improvise in order to respond to the 
particular needs of individual clients.  
 
Exercising discretion as they interact with citizens, public service workers 
(street level bureaucrats) lack the time, information or other resources to 
respond ‘according to the highest standards of decision-making’ (p.xi) in their 
field to each individual case. They are put under pressure by the key features of 
their work settings including: chronically inadequate resources; an ever growing 
demand for services; vague or conflicting organisational expectations and policy 
goals; difficulties in measuring their performance; clients who do not voluntarily 
choose the services. 
 
These workers manage their difficult jobs by developing common routines of 
practice covering ways of organizing their work, modifications of how they 
understand their jobs and modifications of how they conceive of their clients 
(essentially stereotyping more and less deserving clients). The routines 
influence, in turn, the way they do their work – such as managing and conserving 
resources (e.g. by building slack time into their days to give them the capacity to 
respond to unpredictable situations) – and have consequences that include  
controlling clients so they cooperate with procedures and rationing services to 
them e.g. by imposing financial or time costs on clients. Often there is, therefore, 
also a need to establish strategies to manage the consequences of routine 
practices e.g. by referring ‘difficult’ cases to more specialized workers, or 
complaints systems.  Ultimately, moreover, ‘the decisions of street-level 
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bureaucrats, the routines they establish, and the devices they invent to cope with 
uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become the public policies they 
carry out’ (p.xiii, italics in original).  
 
Lipsky acknowledges that SLBs are often committed to public service and have 
high expectations for themselves in their careers, but argues that the demands of 
their work setting challenge these expectations. In these settings they cannot 
deal with clients on an individual basis and have to develop work practices and 
orientations that allow the mass processing of their clients (e.g. teaching a class 
of children not an individual child). They justify their coping mechanisms to 
themselves as pragmatic and reasonable, given their work settings, but these 
mechanisms distort service ideals or put SLBs in the position of ‘manipulating 
citizens on behalf of the agencies from which citizens seek help or expect fair 
treatment’ (p.xv.). Their clients, meanwhile, are ‘bureaucratic subjects’ who, in 
accessing services, ‘must strike a balance between asserting their rights as 
citizens and confirming to the behaviours public agencies seek to place on them 
as clients’  (pxvi). The client’s dilemma is particularly acute if s/he is from a 
different socio-economic, or racial background to public employees. At best, SLBs 
‘invent modes of mass processing that more or less permit them to deal with the 
public fairly, and appropriately and thoughtfully. At worse, they give in to 
favouritism, stereotyping, convenience, and routinizing – all of which serve their 
own or agency purposes’ (p.xiv) 
 
An important note in the revised edition is that Lipsky did not intend to use the 
term street level bureaucrat to apply to all public service workers. Instead, he 
saw SLBy as public service employment of a particular sort, performed under 
certain conditions and pressures in which coping behaviours ‘may widen the gap 
between policy as written and policy as performed’ (p.xvii). In other conditions, 
however, coping behaviours ‘reflect acceptable compromises between the goals 
of enacted policy and the needs of street level workers’. So ‘perhaps it is best to 
imagine a continuum of work experiences ranging from that that are deeply 
stressful and the processing of clients is severely under-resourced, to those that 
provide a reasonable balance between job requirements and successful practice. 
Workers’ places on that continuum may change over time as they gain 
experience, as caseloads and assignments vary, or as the workplace itself adopts 
new approaches or engages new clienteles’ (p.xviii) 
 
Finally, he notes that in his view, despite popular discontent with the work of 
SLBs, there is simply no alternative to people making decisions in public 
services. His contribution is therefore to ‘locate the problems of street-level 
bureaucrats in the structure of their work, and attempt to identify conditions 
that would better support a reconstituted public sector dedicated to appropriate 
services and respect for clients’ (p.xix). 
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Street Level Bureaucracy: contributions  
 
Recent scholarship drawing on Lispky’s ideas1 combined with reflection on the 
current relevance of his  work to a new field of application, health policy and 
systems analysis in low and middle income countries (LMICs)2, suggests that it 
has made three key contributions to the field of public policy analysis. These are 
its recognition that: a) street level bureaucrats (SLBs) have discretion and power 
in implementation, and so their practices are what citizens experience as policy 
and have political consequences; b) SLBs’  behaviour is systematically influenced 
by the organisational and institutional environment in which they work, rather 
being primarily a response to personal preferences and interests;  and c) efforts 
to control SLBs’ behaviour only undermine their  responsiveness to clients, so 
new approaches are needed to support them as the face of a responsive public 
bureaucracy.  
 
What is discretion and why does it matter? 
 
The very notion that SLBs have discretionary power was central to Lipsky’s 
challenge to the top-down policy theorists, and the nature of discretion and its 
consequences have remained two important areas of scholarship. 
 
The nature of discretion 
Lipsky argues that human agency is central to policy implementation, and that 
SLBs will always make their own decisions on at least some issues. Discretion 
occurs ‘whenever the effective limits on [the public officier’s] power leave him 
free  to make a choice among possible courses of action and inaction’ (Davis 
1969, p.4). In other words, discretion is the space between the legal rules in 
which actors exercise choice, the sphere of an actor’s autonomy for decision-
making (Hawkins 1992 and Galligan 1990, respectively, cited in Loyens & 
Maesschalck 2010). Lipsky also argues that this space exists because, on the one 
hand, policy goals are often not clearly stated and policy details are not finalized 
before implementation; and, on the other hand, in pursuing policy goals, SLBs 
are asked to be responsive to the complex challenges clients present, not all of 
which can be predicted.  
 
Subsequent work has illuminated different forms of SLB discretion. One 
distinction is that between strong and weak discretion (Evans & Harris, 2004; 
drawing on Dworkin, 1977). Strong discretion entails both deciding the criteria 
for decision-making and making the decisions, and is commonly exercised by 
professional groups, such as doctors. Sharing occupational characteristics, these 
groups are given valued status by society, perhaps in part because they are seen 
as altruistic, and so are also trusted to use their competence and expertise to 
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make decisions in unpredictable and complex situations hidden from public view 
(Hupe & Hill 2007). Weak discretion, meanwhile, entails applying a standard or 
rule, or making a decision within the rules. Ellis (2011) contrasts the ‘value 
discretion’ of professionals, for example, with the weaker and more informal 
discretion at the disposal of most SLBs, who decide what rule to apply in 
particular situations, or how to interpret a rule in a particular situation.  
 
Empirical work brings alive these conceptual distinctions. An ethnographic study 
of UK child welfare services initiated in 2007, for example, examines social 
worker practices in an era of enhanced performance management and 
procedural standardization, involving the use of information technology to drive 
and record practice (Wastell et al. 2010). The study shows that performance 
indicators became an accepted part of organizational life, clearly influencing 
routine practice. However, social workers exercised discretion in the way they 
applied the established procedures (through their coping strategies) – such as 
‘playing the system’ to buy the time needed to conduct more thorough 
assessments of children and their families than these procedures allow.  They 
also continued ‘to exercise professional discretion through categorisations, 
‘diagnostics’ and the social sorting of children and families’ (p.317). The authors 
also argue that discretion can be seen in the language that social workers used 
about their work: ‘[s]treet level language gives the power to define, reaffirms the 
invisible trade and reinforces the occupational identity whilst at the same time 
rattling the cage of the rule-bound bureaucrat’ (p.317). Weak discretion, thus, 
encompasses doing their work in ways SLBs feel is appropriate and, as Lipsky 
also noted (1980), in ways that maintain their own sense of identity and self-
esteem. 
 
More recent empirical work has, meanwhile, brought new perspectives on 
strong discretion. Drawing from American SLBs’ personal narratives, Maynard-
Mooney and Musheno (2000) have introduced the notion of ‘citizen agent’ to 
contrast with the ‘state agents’ portrayed by Lipsky. The term seeks to highlight 
that SLBs see themselves as working in their client’s interests rather than as an 
extension of the state, guided by their own judgment of each person’s worth. 
Similarly, Durose (2011) describes UK local government workers involved in a 
range of community and health development activities as ‘civic entrepreneurs’. 
They draw on their local knowledge and resources, including policy resources, to 
experiment and innovate in engaging with hard to reach community groups and 
confronting ‘wicked’ problems like social exclusion. These authors argue that 
citizen agents are ‘rule saturated’ not ‘rule bound’ and, acting like any 
professional, use their discretion pragmatically in response to client need 
(Durose 2009; Maynard-Moody & Musheno 2000). 
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Variation between SLBs in their discretion may reflect differences in jobs or 
changing expectations of SLBs in general. In a hospital, for example, there are 
both professionals, such as doctors and nurses, with stronger discretion, and 
non-professionals groups, such as clerical and ancillary workers, with weaker 
discretion. Some jobs, meanwhile, demand multiple levels of discretion to match 
the varied nature of expected tasks (Piore 2011). Durose (2011), finally, 
discusses how expectations of front line workers have changed over time in the 
UK, in line with changing bureaucratic forms. In the 1970s, Weberian 
bureaucrats were expected to follow rules, the SLBs of the 1990s were expected 
to use discretion to ration services and the civic entrepreneurs of the 2000s were 
expected to engage actively with community clients. As Lipsky noted (2010, 
p.xviii) there is, therefore, a ‘continuum of work experiences’ within street-level 
bureaucracies. 
 
Why discretion matters 1 – the political consequences  
In practical terms, SLB discretion matters because its use is a political act, 
‘potentially building or undermining support for government as a vehicle for 
advancing social welfare, equity and justice’ (Brodkin 2012, p.947).  Through 
their decisions SLBs influence both citizens’ levels of access to public services or 
welfare benefits, as well as their experience of that access (Hupe & Hill 2007). 
Sometimes their exercise of discretion has critical consequences for the life 
chances of their clients (Marinetto 2011). SLB discretion, therefore, also 
mediates the broader relationship of state and citizen – as SLBs ‘teach clients to 
behave properly ’ and the public trusts SLBs to make significant decisions about 
citizen welfare (2010, pp.235–6). SLBs are, quite simply, the daily reality of the 
state in most people’s experience and so their behaviours signal the value the 
state, society places on different people. In their own view, street level workers 
are ‘empowered citizen agents, who in their decisions to ration resources, 
provide access to programmes, and sanction individuals, both communicate and 
convey social status’ (Maynard-Moody & Musheno 2000, p.355).  
 
A major strand of SLB empirical work continues to provide evidence confirming 
that ‘the types of coping strategies that Lipsky identified are both prevalent and 
plentiful … robbing services of their substantive value and skewing the 
distribution of benefits’ (Brodkin 2012, p.943). Ellis (2007), for example, 
examines British experience of replacing direct care schemes for older and 
disabled people with cash payments that, in principle, allow clients greater 
choice and autonomy in deciding what personal assistance they receive and from 
whom. In addition to their formal role of rationing available resources, Ellis finds 
evidence that SLBs ration information to limit demand, and stereotype clients – 
for example, by assuming older clients do not want decision-making autonomy 
and that middle class clients were better able to take advantage of direct 
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payments.  These attitudes towards clients are essentially personal judgements 
about who does and does not deserve support.  
 
Although few studies of SLB behaviour have been conducted in the health sector, 
by definition health professionals might be assumed to work primarily in the 
patient’s interests – like citizen agents. However, some LMIC studies, for 
example, have shown how professional values may go hand in hand with 
attitudes and behaviours towards patients that are replete with SLB coping 
strategies and that have distributional consequences. Patients are quite strongly 
‘controlled’ in health facilities through queuing and patient flow systems, and 
informal practices such as the timing of tea breaks, are subject to stereotyping 
(such as judgements over who ‘deserves’ access to family planning or abortion 
services) and can experience health providers as demeaning and even abusive 
towards them (Harrison et al. 2000; Walker & Gilson 2004) . Patients’ poor 
experiences in health facilities may, therefore, lead them to dis-trust providers, 
to delay seeking care, or even deter them from accessing care altogether (Gilson 
2007). The least powerful patients commonly bear the brunt of SLB behaviour, 
and its consequences, including increased costs, can threaten family livelihoods 
(Goudge et al. 2009; Russell & Gilson 2006) and exacerbate exclusion and 
impoverishment (Tibandebage & Mackintosh 2005). 
 
However SLB behaviour is always complex. Horton (2006) presents an 
ethnographic account of experience in a US mental health clinic located in a 
hospital serving a low income and largely Latino immigrant patient population, 
in 2003-5. The majority of clinicians were also from Latin America, but from 
more privileged backgrounds, and worked in the clinic because they felt it 
offered better care for its target population than either the mainstream public or 
private sector services. They played dual roles in the clinic, informally acting as 
patient advocates in the wider bureaucracy and formally working as therapists – 
with both roles important to their care for their clients. Patient advocacy roles 
included, for example, supporting victims of political violence facing deportation 
in their engagement with the legal and immigration system. Although important 
to patient treatment, and acknowledged by the hospital administration, this 
work was not seen as part of their job, and had to be done out of working hours 
on top of usual workloads. At the same time, within the clinic their professional 
practices were being squeezed by cost containment measures intended to 
promote clinician productivity, all of which most affected the uninsured and 
immigrants with serious psychosocial issues. The measures included time limits 
on appointments, denying free care to uninsured patients, and providing group 
rather than individual therapy. In response to these pressures the clinicians 
themselves also decided to deny future care to any patient after three successive 
failures to arrive for a pre-booked appointment. As Lipsky (1980) noted, SLBs 
have two mindsets – the professional, involving discretion and autonomy  and 
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the bureaucrat, compliant with supervisor’s directives - with different 
consequences for particularly vulnerable patient groups. 
 
There is also wider evidence of the complex realities but positive potential of SLB 
discretion. They work as principled agents fulfilling their professional goals in 
the Danish welfare system (May & Winter 2007), or combine coping strategies 
with professional behaviour, rising above the demands of their jobs as US school 
psychologists to provide needed services (Summers & Semrud-Clikeman 2000) 
or moderate practice to accommodate the non-functional features of policy in 
Finnish and Swedish psychiatric services (Markström et al. 2009; Saario 2012). 
Studies that regard SLBs as civic entrepreneurs, meanwhile, note how they use 
discretion creatively, bending policy rules to be responsive to community 
concerns but also trying to pursue government agendas (Durose, 2009; 
Markstrom et al., 2009; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000).  
 
A much smaller body of work has so far considered the influence of SLB actions 
on the relationship between state and citizen, and further research is important. 
There is, for example, a little evidence of how SLBs: mediate social status and 
identities, such as race and gender (Brodkin 2012); act corruptly (Staranova & 
Malikova 2007) or offer responsive services (Berenson 2010), in wider contexts 
of bureaucratic failure. At a conceptual level, meanwhile, political scientists 
(Rothstein & Stolle 2008; Rothstein & Stolle 2001) pick up on Lipsky’s discussion 
of trust and SLBs. They argue that people’s experience of the local political 
institutions responsible for public policy implementation and specifically, the 
impartiality and fairness of their treatment, affects their trust in these 
institutions. This institutional trust influences, in turn, levels of ‘generalised 
trust’ or social capital, in society at large.  In similar vein, Mark Moore (Moore 
1995) has coined the term ‘public value’ to capture the two potential benefits of 
public services: producing things (services) of value to citizens and operating in 
fair, efficient and accountable ways that meet their desire for a well ordered 
society.   
 
Why discretion matters 2 – understandings of policy, accountability and legitimacy  
In analytic terms, discretion matters because it challenges the dominant account 
of public policy implementation  – and how to manage it to achieve policy 
goals/public value.  Within the top-down perspective on policy-making, central 
level decision-makers are assumed to hold the dominant power, and 
implementers are expected to comply with the instructions and guidelines laid 
down for them (Barrett 2004). Underpinning this perspective is the normative 
judgement that within a bureaucracy, implementers are accountable through 
their superiors to the legitimate (democratically) elected government. They 
must, therefore, align with the democratic will and the rule of law (Ellis 2011). 
SLB deviation from policy prescriptions and guidance is, in this view, illegitimate. 
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The empirical evidence shows, however, that policy as experienced by clients is 
embodied in the formal and informal practices of SLBs, whatever paper and 
rhetorical goals are formally established (Brodkin 2012). Human agency and 
interactions are key influences not only over how policy is implemented but also 
over what policy is; indeed, for all bottom uppers, policy-making is still in 
progress at the moment of delivery (Hudson & Lowe 2004; Parsons 1995). 
Ultimately, the reality of SLBs’ agency means that expecting compliance with 
centrally imposed rules is unrealistic. It suggests instead that they must be 
empowered to perform, to exercise their discretion to be responsive to clients – 
and to be held accountable for that (Barrett 2004).  
 
This represents the crux of the top down/bottom up debates: the distinction 
between what ought to be and what is, and between the traditional top down 
notions of accountability within Weberian bureaucracies and the emerging 
understandings of multiple accountabilities within networked systems (Hupe & 
Hill 2007; see also below).  
 
At one level, this point reflects very different understandings about the nature of 
policy. Moving beyond an instrumental view of policy and a linear view of policy-
making, the very notion of discretion and the idea of policy as practice reflects  
understanding of the socially constructed and constituted nature of public policy. 
Policy is not fixed by central level planners but negotiated through power and 
discourse in the course of its implementation (Laws & Hajer 2006). The idea that 
SLBs work within rules that define their power and yet, influenced by their 
values and interests, use their discretion to re-define those rules, reflects 
broader discussion about the interplay between structure and agency. Barrett 
(Barrett 2004), a British contemporary of Lipksy, for example, notes how she 
was influenced by the notion of structuration (Giddens 1984) - the 
‘understanding [that] structures or rules of the game determine the status quo of 
power relations, but since these are socially constructed they are also 
susceptible to change through human agency’. She argues: ‘This has offered a 
new way of looking at concepts of power and negotiation in implementation as 
the dialectic between structure and agency, which reinforces a view of 
performance, or what happens in practice, as a function of the scope or 
limitations of scope for action (rules and roles), and the use made of that scope 
(values and interests)’.  
 
At another level, judgements about legitimacy themselves reflect broader 
political imperatives and ideological paradigms (as Lipksy, 1980 himself noted, 
ch12). The benefit of hindsight provided by reflecting on the thirty years since 
the initial publication of Lipsky’s book allows sight of the evolution of thinking 
about bureaucracy. Whilst the global context may be broadly similar (economic 
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uncertainty, growing poverty, increasing demands on public services), there 
have been huge changes in approaches to public administration and 
management (Ellis 2011).  
 
The era of the Weberian bureau-professional regime, in which access to public 
resources was controlled by professionals applying bureaucratic standards and 
eligibility rules that sought to ensure equal and fair treatment for all, was 
overtaken, globally, by the new public management era. Linked to neo-liberal 
economic thinking, this era brought performance monitoring and market 
mechanisms into the public sector and entailed a tightening of top down control. 
At the same time, however, bottom up theorists continued to track practice and 
develop thinking around the dispersed power within, and networked nature of, 
bureaucracies (Barrett 2004). New understandings of governance have 
subsequently emerged that recognize the inter-play of policy and action and the 
range of forces shaping action within bureaucracies, as well as more relational 
understandings of accountability (Durose 2011; Hupe & Hill 2007). In the UK, for 
example, the Thatcherite emphasis on market mechanisms was moderated by 
new Labour’s emphasis on consensual governance, involving partnerships and 
networks between public sector and community groups (Ellis 2011), and 
inclusive policy processes that also engaged with public sector staff  (Durose 
2011). In Europe, more generally, decentralization of authority combined with 
‘activation policies’ intended to reduce client dependency on the welfare state, 
have brought new roles for SLBs (Rice 2013). In the US, meanwhile, Mark 
Moore’s work on public management and public value (1995) has opened up 
discussion both about the nature of public value and the related strategies of 
public leadership (as distinct from private value and leadership).  
 
Each of these different eras represent different ways of understanding the role of 
the public sector in society, and different ideas about its primary imperatives. 
The balance between efficiency, equity and responsiveness, as well as different 
approaches to management within it, are primary concerns. Ellis (2011) posits, 
therefore, four different forms of SLB action and discretion, framed by the 
balance between professionalism and managerialism, and the degree of 
formality/informality (and related legitimacy) with which discretion is 
exercised. The notions of state agent and citizen agent capture something similar 
and highlight the critical difference in understandings of legitimacy: are the rules 
of policy, developed through vertical lines of political and bureaucratic 
accountability the touchstone of bureaucratic legitimacy or is that touchstone 
rather, the bureaucrat’s responsiveness to the client and community?  
 
What shapes SLB behaviour? 
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Lipsky’s second critical contribution to understanding policy implementation is 
his recognition that SLB discretionary behaviour is patterned by the structural 
conditions of the working environment, rather than being the random acts of 
self-interested individuals behaving badly as envisaged in, for example, public 
choice theory (Downs 1967; Niskanen 1971). Individual SLBs are, therefore, not 
solely or even primarily to blame for the challenges the public experiences in 
accessing public services, as their behaviours are shaped by their broader work 
environment. Lipsky (2010, p.xv) talked about the ‘corrupted world of service’ in 
which SLBs work. He argues that they are caught in fundamentally tragic 
situations where they simply cannot put their ideals into practice, and instead 
lower their expectations of themselves and clients. This is the ‘dilemma of the 
individual in public services’, as the sub-title of the book has it.  
 
This insight is confirmed by empirical evidence. Studies show that SLBs 
generally do not oppose policy aims or deliberately work to subvert them, but 
instead find that being responsive to clients is simply ‘incompatible with their 
work lives’ (Brodkin, 2012; in the health sector, for example,  see Walker & 
Gilson, 2004). Lipsky gave particular attention to resource constraints, workload 
pressures, policy ambiguities, bureaucratic efforts to exert greater control and 
relations with clients as structural influences over SLB behaviour. However, he 
also acknowledged a ‘continuum of workplace experiences ranging from those 
that are deeply stressful and the processing of clients is underresourced, to those 
that provide a reasonable balance between job requirements and successful 
practice’ (2010, p. xviii).  
 
Subsequent empirical work provides evidence of four main categories of 
influence: a) individual decision-maker characteristics (such as professional 
norms, personal interests, moral values, gender, ethnicity, role definition, 
personal meanings) b) organizational characteristics (internal structure, rules 
and constraints, organizational routines and culture, workload pressures), c) 
client attributes (levels of need, or perceptions of clients), and d) 
extraorganisational factors (e.g. broader community, laws, regulations, media, 
other service agencies) (Loyens & Maesschalck 2010). Jewell and Glaser (2006), 
for example, derive and test an empirical framework of six influencing factors: 
SLB authority to influence clients; role expectations reflected in SLB attitudes to 
work and clients; workload; client contacts (frequency, regularity, quality, time); 
personal knowledge and expertise; and incentives (formal and informal, 
including intrinsic rewards).  
 
However, the mix of influencing factors play out in different ways in different 
situations – depending on the scope and nature of SLB discretion in a particular 
task or job. Empirical work has, on the one hand, demonstrated that resource 
constraints and managerial interventions – such as target setting, incentives and 
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the use of information technology – influence SLB behaviour, narrowing or 
containing even weak discretion (Brodkin 2012). On the other hand, street level 
factors are also clearly influential in some settings and perhaps especially where 
SLBs have wider or stronger discretion (May & Winter 2007).  
 
At an individual level, recent work has again demonstrated how personal beliefs 
and norms about fairness influence the personal judgements ‘citizen agents’ 
make about the relative worth of individual citizens (Marinetto 2011; Maynard-
Moody & Musheno 2000). Relatedly, Evans (2010) argues that professional 
status is important as it entails commitment to values that focus on service user 
wellbeing (over economic priorities), and brings a greater degree of decision-
making autonomy than held by other SLB groups. He criticizes Lipsky for 
overlooking this influence. Other individual level influences include, for example, 
SLBs’ understandings of their jobs (Bergen & While 2005; UK community 
nurses) or policies (Pennay 2012): Australia, policy officers and drinking laws), 
feelings of competence and awareness of the responsibility that comes with 
power (Ydreborg, Ekberg, & Nilsson, 2008: Sweden, social insurance), and 
knowledge of local situations (Durose, 2011: UK, local government). 
 
Beyond the formal features of organizational settings, the broad SLB literature 
also highlights the web of horizontal and vertical relations in which SLBs are 
nested as important influences over their behaviour (Hupe & Hill, 2007). SLBs 
themselves identify three key relationships (Maynard-Moody & Musheno 2000); 
(see also Marinetto 2011). Those with: citizen clients, fellow street workers and 
the system within which they work (including elected officials, even the media). 
SLBs see themselves as independent moral actors in opposition to the system, 
which offers some loose support but also can intrude into their work. 
Interactions with clients can bring both a sense of accomplishment and threat, 
but interaction with peers, their primary reference group, is generally one of 
mutual support and learning. Collaboration across sectors/organisations can, 
nonetheless, be undermined by perceptions of relative inter-professional status 
(Halliday et al. 2009).  
 
Another potentially important relationship, although overlooked by Lipsky 
originally, is that between SLBs and their line managers. Evans (2010) 
distinguishes between central and local managers. He presents evidence to show 
that shared professional commitment (in this case, among UK social workers) 
allows front line workers and their managers to collaborate in addressing the 
needs of service users as they judge best, despite higher level managerial 
pressure to focus on expenditure control and performance management. 
Although Brewer (2005) also finds evidence of front line supervisors’ influence, 
the limited available evidence is equivocal. For example, a Danish study of 
employment policy implementation at local government level uses statistical 
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analysis, unusually, to test various related hypotheses (May & Winter 2007). It 
determines that the amount of supervision and degree of delegation have some, 
but relatively little, influence over how caseworkers interpret policy guidelines 
in their interactions with clients – in comparison to the influence of local 
politicians and, most importantly, SLBs’ own understanding of policy goals, 
personal acceptance of those goals and perceptions of their own knowledge of 
relevant policy rules. 
 
Managerial and other relational influences are, however, recognised in Piore’s 
(2011) more recent and, for SLBy literature, unusual exploration of the influence 
of organisational culture. Starting from the understanding that SLBy is a 
particular organisational form distinct from classic Weberian bureaucracy or 
markets, Piore draws on sociological theory and case studies (of labour 
inspection organisations in Latin America and southern Europe and the US 
Department of Defense’s research arm) to understand how organisations shape 
behaviour beyond incentives or bureaucratic rules. He actively looks for 
explanations of innovative and entrepreneurial behaviour (like that of civic 
entrepreneurs). He argues that in an SLBy decisions are made within a 
framework of tacit rules and procedures, embedded in the organisational 
culture, passed on through the socialization of new organisational recruits, and 
reinforced, and evolving, through discussion among peers and managers. Theory 
suggests that organisational culture is likely to have greater influence over 
individuals where they depend on their organizational colleagues for approval 
and support, and where organisations operate in a hostile environment. In these 
settings, managers might encourage SLBs’ innovative, entrepreneurial behaviour 
by shaping the organizational conversations that, in turn, shape practice.  
 
Overall, therefore, SLBy theory has contributed understanding about 
relationships within organisations (Friedman 2006) and fed into wider work on 
the sociology of organisations (Hill & Hupe 2009). The very notion of discretion, 
as discussed earlier, is tied into consideration of the structure-agency dialectic. 
Based on this, Rice (2013) develops what she calls a ‘micro-institutionalist 
theory of policy implementation’ that presents an overarching framework of 
influences over the caseworker-client interaction (Figure 1). On the one hand, 
the standardized interactions between caseworker and client become part of the 
broader institutional framework guiding those interactions and restricting what 
actions are permitted or are regarded as relevant or appropriate. On the other 
hand, that institutional framework may change not only as a result of systemic 
forces (such as change ideological change) but also as a result of individuals 
doing things differently in that interaction. She argues that whilst legal and 
regulatory documents, staff and budgets represent the building blocks of the 
welfare state, it only becomes real as a political institution when caseworkers 
(SLBs) meet citizens and take decisions. But the moment ‘at which the welfare 
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state becomes a manifest reality in the interaction between caseworker and 
clients is also the moment at which it starts to evolve and possibly to change’ 
(p.6). Her framework bridges the micro-level of the caseworker-client 
interaction, the meso level of the implementing organisation and the macro level 
of the wider societal context. She argues it develops Lipsky’s thinking in making 
explicit the interrelatedness between the case worker-client interaction and its 
wider institutional and systemic context.  
 
Figure 1: Overview of systems and institutions influencing the caseworker-client 




How can SLBs be better supported to offer public value?  
 
The third critical contribution of Lipsky is his recognition that attempting to 
control SLBs to contain or prevent their discretion, as proposed by top down 
theorists, only leads them to stereotype and disregard client needs (Hill & Hupe 
2009).   
 
Subsequent empirical work has only proved the point. Although the 
managerialist interventions of target setting, incentives and the use of 
information technology, together with cost containment interventions, influence 
the scope and exercise of discretion, they do not control it (Brodkin 2012). They 
may encourage ‘compliance without conviction’ (Wastell et al. 2010) or produce 
fresh conditions and requirements for covert rationing (Evans 2010; Keiser 
2010). Most critically, as Lipsky predicted, the efficiency gains that are achieved 
through managerial intervention ‘squeeze out’ SLB responsiveness to client 
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need, and so have negative consequences for quality and efficacy (eg. Marinetto 
2011), and as yet little known consequences for equity and discrimination. 
Whether the (unanticipated) consequences are judged as positive or negative is 
ultimately an ideological or political judgement about the role of the state in 
society and the importance of responsiveness as a public sector goal. At the very 
least, however, Brodkin (2012) urges caution in using incentives to influence SLB 
behaviour and public sector performance.  
 
These experiences offer important insights for health system development in 
LMICs. Strongly influenced by global organisations, international power relations 
and national interest groups, particularly medical professionals, health policy 
implementation in LMICs is commonly seen to be a function of exercising central 
authority within machine-like organisations. The solutions to the gap between 
policy goals and implementation experience are, therefore, often seen to lie in 
action to guide individual implementors’ behaviour – such as clinical guidelines 
and  performance (or results-based) based payments (e.g. Lewin et al. 2008). 
 
So, what other managerial approaches can support SLBs, and hold them 
accountable as they allocate public resources and mediate state-citizen 
relationships?  
 
In the revised edition, Lipsky (2010, pp. 235–6) notes that the need for human 
judgement in policy implementation means that the ‘central challenge for 
management is to improve workers’ capacity to render that judgement 
dispassionately’. Whilst treating everyone alike is necessary to build public trust, 
he argues that exceptions can be acceptable when neither discriminatory nor the 
result of favouritism, and where SLBs have the skills, training, and experience to 
exercise discretion properly (see also Rothstein 1998).  
 
Recognition of the moral reasoning underpinning SLB discretion (Maynard-
Moody & Musheno 2000) points to the importance of strengthening SLBs’ 
reflective practice. Lipsky (1980) suggested, for example, that it is important to 
create regular moments of reflection among peers and with managers, to review 
practice and learn from experience (as also noted subsequently by others 
thinking about SLBy: Brodkin, 2012; Rothstein & Stolle, 2001; Rowe, 2012). 
Deliberative and reflective practice is itself a recognized and growing area of 
conceptual and empirical work (Schon 1983; Ghaye 2008), including 
consideration of the role of communities of practice in supporting learning 
(Wenger 1998). A Dutch example of efforts to improve individual ethical practice 
and, ultimately, public trust in the tax administration is instructive (van Blijswijk 
et al. 2004). The approach combined external oversight of standardized rules 
and codes of conduct with processes to encourage deliberation among people 
within the organization about their personal practice (through training, use of 
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counselors, and reflection groups add), in an effort to develop their moral 
compasses and ethical judgement. 
 
Although intending to influence individual behaviour, processes of deliberation 
and reflective practice are, therefore, likely to recognize and build on the 
complex sets of relationships within which SLBs are nested. Hupe and Hill 
(2007) provide  a comprehensive conceptual account of these relationships and 
their relevance to street level accountability. Rather than, as in top down 
approaches, seeing accountability as purely an issue of compliance to rules 
(enforcement) or targets (performance) they also allow for co-production, 
entailing professional or participatory forms of accountability (reflecting bottom 
up perspectives). Indeed, understanding accountability as ‘a social relationship 
in which an actor feels obligation to explain and justify his conduct to some 
significant other’ (Bovens 1998, p.172, cited in Hupe & Hill 2007), the multiple 
relationships within which SLBs work, therefore, provide various ways through 
which citizens can hold SLBs to account. All are likely relevant in supporting 
improved SLB performance, within balanced approaches that take account of 
different types of SLBs, organisations and role expectations.  
 
Although there is clearly great scope and need for more empirical research to 
understand accountabilities as practiced at street level, some ideas about these 
different dimensions can be derived from existing work. Based on analysis of SLB 
failure in UK social work, Marinetto (2011), for example, points to the potential 
role of peer accountability, exercised through informal professional 
relationships, in encouraging SLB responsiveness to client needs. Lipsky (2010) 
himself highlighted models of SLB practice that encourage open discussion of 
potential errors in decision-making and teamwork to enable learning and 
support decision-making. Hill (2003), meanwhile, actively explores the role of 
professional organisations, academics and other interest groups as 
‘implementation resources’ supporting learning. Their support can take the form 
of basic and in-service skills’ training, but they can also provide a range of other 
intellectual resources – theoretical perspectives, insight into what policy means, 
ideas on ‘best’ practices’ for implementors or on organizational technologies for 
implementation. Although outside government these groups may be seen to be 
more prestigious and carry more legitimacy than government-based resources.  
 
Another professional resource available to SLBs, and one not originally well 
recognized by Lipsky, are managers -  where they work to offer professional 
support and guidance rather than just acting as agents of hierarchical control 
(Evans 2010). Recognition of co-production as a mode of implementation also  
directs attention to the role of trust as a managerial mechanism, instead of rules 
or contracts (Hill & Hupe 2009; see also Gilson, 2003, and Gilson, Palmer, & 
Schneider, 2005 for consideration of the role of trust in LMIC health systems). 
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Related managerial strategies focus on leadership of people by building their 
individual capabilities, building teams, and shaping organizational culture 
(Mintzberg 2009). In thinking about how to shape organisational culture, Piore 
(2011), meanwhile, highlights the managerial role encouraging interpretive 
conversations within an organization. These create spaces for the tacit 
knowledge of SLBs to be heard and shared, supporting the organisational 
sensemaking (Weick 2009) that underpins current SLB practices as well as 
enabling change in those practices. Reflecting institutionalist thinking, this 
managerial approach emphasizes the role of ideas, narratives and meanings in 
shaping SLB behaviour, and, again, the role of deliberative and reflective practice 
in influencing behavioural change. Piore also suggests a link to the wider world 
of systems thinking and continuous quality improvement strategies (such as 
benchmarking, the Toyota method, the Six Sigma approach etc). All of these, as 
also identified by Lipsky in the revised edition (2010), use indicators to 
stimulate discussion rather than primarily to judge performance. 
 
Relationships with clients are another stimulus for better practice and line of 
SLB accountability (Hill & Hupe, 2009). Lipsky (2010) suggested clients could 
become a stronger reference group for SLBs by, for example, involving them in 
the definition of good practice at street level, empowering them to be more 
involved in decision-making, or moving towards models of care that are based on 
team not individual relationships. In LMICs local health facility committees have 
been quite widely established as mechanisms of community accountability, with 
variable success (McCoy et al. 2012; Molyneux et al. 2012). Finlay and Sandall 
(2009), meanwhile, discuss a new UK model of midwifery care that offers 
possibilities for relationship continuity and a focus on the experience of service 
users. Where SLBs work as citizen agents their accountability to the community 
is, moreover, both acknowledged and encouraged. They  ‘…engage with the 
community and develop strategies aimed at achieving community-centred or 
‘civic’ ends’ (Durose 2009, p.991), building relationships and  sharing 
information with, as well as signposting for, their community clients (Durose 
2009).  
 
Finally, Brodkin (2012) points to the potential value of backward mapping 
(Elmore 1979) as a process for thinking through how policy itself can enable 
SLBs to engage appropriately in their human interactions with clients. Paying 
more attention to policy delivery as policy is developed was encouraged under 
the new Labour government  in the UK (1997-2010). The principle of policy 
inclusiveness encouraged policy makers to consider to involve those involved in 
policy implementation at an early stage of policy design and to think through the 
possible policy impacts on intended beneficiaries (Bochel & Evans 2007). The 
importance of framing policy in ways that enable front line workers, rather than 
seeking to control them, has also been picked up in systems thinking work on UK 
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health policy. Chapman (2004, p.91) specifically suggests that policy outputs 
‘should be as unprescriptive about means as possible’. They should establish the 
direction of change clearly, set limits on implementation strategies, allocate 
resources for reasonable lengths of time without specifying how they must be 
spent, clearly specific areas of discretion for local managers and workers, and 




Lipsky’s seminal work illuminates the essential human and political features of 
policy and implementation, providing insights that remain ground-breaking 
thirty years later. For practitioners and researchers alike, this is not just a classic 
book - it has persistent relevance. Perhaps most importantly, its still relatively 
untested proposals about how to strengthen the performance of public sector 
bureaucracies offer value worldwide today. In LMICs, for example, efforts to 
improve the responsiveness of health systems could focus on encouraging 
reflective practice, trust-based workplace management and applying 
sensemaking as a way of shaping organizational culture.  
 
Future research globally and across sectors should, finally, follow Lipsky’s 
example in seeking to understand street level bureaucracies from the inside out 
(Brodkin 2012), for example through ethnographic work (eg. Maynard-Moody & 
Musheno 2000) or interpretive policy analysis (eg. Durose 2009). The gaps in 
current research show the particular value of better understanding the forces 
shaping SLB behaviour and of testing proposals for re-framing them to support 
public service improvements. In the face of fluctuating political and ideological 
support for public services there is also a continued need to demonstrate the 
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1 A scan of the main and continuing lines of SLB scholarship across continent and sectors was 
conducted as background for this chapter. Using the simple search term  ‘street level bureaucracy’  
(with particular but not exclusive interest when the term, or the word Lipsky, was used in the paper 
title) I initially searched for recent, published journal papers within Thomson Reuter’s Web of 
Knowledge (a general database) and the Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied Health (a health 
database). This was followed by a hand search for unusual references from review papers and a 
limited number of more specific geographic and author searches in Google Scholar (e.g. SLB Africa; 
SLB Asia; SLB India; SLB Rothstein). 
 
2 The emerging field of health policy and systems research takes seriously the idea that 
implementers are people with agency - recognizing their roles in bringing alive policy through their 
practices and so becoming what the health system is experienced as by patients and citizens 
(Lehmann & Gilson 2013; Ssengooba et al. 2007). In line with broader SLB thinking, health systems 
are, therefore, understood as relational systems in which people are influenced by each other and 
their broader institutional environment – requiring new approaches both to managing (Gilson 
2012) and researching within them (Gilson et al. 2011; Sheikh et al.  2011). The broader SLB 
literature, thus, offers insights and ideas to stimulate this area of research. 
 
